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Saints were down by 15

Lost in all of this is Iowa's decision to kick the extra point after taking an 8-7 lead after the safety and ensuing TD, which I questioned at the time. The extra point made it 9-7, but Nate Silver's chart shows that going for two would have been the much better statistical alternative. Had Iowa converted and taken a 10-7 lead, no subsequent two-point conversion would have been necessary. And, a failure to convert would have made clear that a pair of two-point conversions were necessary as the game neared the end.

One thing the chart doesn't capture, and what I think some on here are trying to express, is the emotion/momentum that exists after having scored. I'm guessing Silver's chart is correct in a vacuum, but sports aren't played in a vacuum. We've all seen instances of teams losing leads because they start to play tight, or not to lose (e.g., Nebraska). I thought going for two was the correct choice because I'm more in the Nate Silver camp, but I can see why the counter arguments are being made.
Good point about the first extra point early in the game. Silver would say the difference between 10-7 and 9-7 is greater than 9-7 vs. 8-7. But once again, fail and the coach is more likely to get second-guessed by those with conventional wisdom if they fail to convert.

About your second point.. As a 2-point conversion attempt always follows a touchdown, doesn't the offensive team always have the momentum?
 
Good point about the first extra point early in the game. Silver would say the difference between 10-7 and 9-7 is greater than 9-7 vs. 8-7. But once again, fail and the coach is more likely to get second-guessed by those with conventional wisdom if they fail to convert.

About your second point.. As a 2-point conversion attempt always follows a touchdown, doesn't the offensive team always have the momentum?

Absolutely. But, as some have claimed, going for two and failing can kill the mojo and make it tougher to even get back to a situation where they can score twice. But, if you kick the extra point and trail by just eight points, the excitement isn't squelched, and maybe you recover an onside kick or force a turnover on defense because just one more score (and a successful 2-point conversion) will get you to overtime. But, having to score twice might be too deflating.

In theory, it shouldn't matter...the defense should almost always be trying to force turnovers, and there's no reason to think a team would try any harder in one situation than the other. But, these are kids, playing in front of a home crowd on senior day, and maybe it's not as cut and tried as a simple statistical model would suggest.

Again, my mindset is you go for two as quickly as possible so at least you know what your options are with the maximum amount of time remaining, but I can see the other side of the discussion, even if I don't necessarily agree with it.
 
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Lost in all of this is Iowa's decision to kick the extra point after taking an 8-7 lead after the safety and ensuing TD, which I questioned at the time. The extra point made it 9-7, but Nate Silver's chart shows that going for two would have been the much better statistical alternative. Had Iowa converted and taken a 10-7 lead, no subsequent two-point conversion would have been necessary. And, a failure to convert would have made clear that a pair of two-point conversions were necessary as the game neared the end.

One thing the chart doesn't capture, and what I think some on here are trying to express, is the emotion/momentum that exists after having scored. I'm guessing Silver's chart is correct in a vacuum, but sports aren't played in a vacuum. We've all seen instances of teams losing leads because they start to play tight, or not to lose (e.g., Nebraska). I thought going for two was the correct choice because I'm more in the Nate Silver camp, but I can see why the counter arguments are being made.

For those old enough to remember, we went through this earlier in Tiller's tenure.

He had a chart. We went for 2, early in some games, and it came back to bite us in the @ss.

What we learned at the time was, take the sure point every time, and only go for the 2 point conversion (much lower percentage) when you absolutely have to.

Even though some people on this forum think they'd make a great coach by taking theoretical high-risk plays, they wouldn't.

Joe learned from it.
 
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